Prospects of peace dim

Syed Nooruzzaman

US and Taliban negotiators wrapping up their eight rounds of peace talks

The US-Taliban historic accord, almost certain to be signed in the first week of September, may result in Washington getting disentangled from Afghanistan as desired after withdrawing its remaining troops from there (in fact, it will reduce their number from 14000 to 8000 troops). But no one can say it with certainty that it will bring about the much-needed peace there

The truth is that at this stage the US is not as much bothered about establishing peace in Afghanistan as it is about withdrawing itself honourably from a difficult war theatre where it had landed itself 18 years ago --- in 2001 --- in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks without keeping in mind an exit route.

The latest policy initiative is a clear admission that no power on earth, including the US, the sole surviving super power, can eliminate an enemy with military muscle alone under the circumstances prevailing today. If such a war prolongs, as it happened in the case of Afghanistan, and the forces to be destroyed are guided by an ideology, even if it is an extremist ideology mixed with an element of strong nationalism, there are greater chances of the militaristic approach ending in a fiasco.

However, in such a situation, diplomacy can prove to be the most effective weapon. Diplomacy mixed with the use of military might may also produce the desired results if there is honesty and a clear-cut commitment.

Barack Obama The Obama administration decided to follow a strategy which involved withdrawal of the US and other NATO forces from Afghanistan, allowing Afghans to run their country the way they wanted to. The US then tried to find a way to induct the Taliban in the power structure in Kabul but without success. The primary reason for the failure was the Taliban insisted on total withdrawal of the foreign forces from their country.

The US, so far, has suffered more than it has gained after risking its resources in Afghanistan. When it plunged into a civil war-ravaged nation with the aim of eliminating the Taliban in 2001, the then George Bush administration appeared to be sure that Washington would achieve its objectives with its well-oiled military machine, leaving no trace of the extremist forces in Afghanistan. But the objectives proved to be elusive. The US found to have been caught in a quagmire, a situation in which it could damage only its own interests.

The Obama administration, therefore, decided to follow a different strategy which involved withdrawal of the US and other NATO forces from Afghanistan, allowing Afghans to run their country the way they wanted to. The US then tried to find a way to induct the Taliban in the power structure in Kabul but without success. The primary reason for the failure was the Taliban insisted on total withdrawal of the foreign forces from their country which was not acceptable to the US.

President Donald Trump, in 2017, decided to handle Afghanistan in a different way, adopting a tactic which was akin to the strategy of President Bush. He announced a big increase in the number of US troops in Afghanistan with a view to not only immobilising the extremist forces there but also to meddle in the affairs of the region on the pretext of protecting Washington's strategic interests.

But within a few months he realised that he was indulging in a futile exercise. There were more important objectives to be achieved that to remain entangled in a war theatre which could be managed with low-cost means. Hence his latest efforts to rope in the Taliban in the political dispensation in Kabul after extracting some commitments, including the one that no part of Afghanistan should be allowed to be used by foreign extremist forces like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The Taliban would also have to give a pledge to shun the path of violence.

Donald Trump President Donald Trump decided to handle Afghanistan in a different way, adopting a tactic which was akin to the strategy of President Bush. He announced a big increase in the number of US troops in Afghanistan with a view to not only immobilising the extremist forces there but also to meddle in the affairs of the region on the pretext of protecting Washington's strategic interests. But within a few months, he realised that he was indulging in a futile exercise.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan with U.S. President Donald J. Trump This way President Trump wants a major election promise to be fulfilled before he gets fully busy with the 2020 presidential elections. He may interpret the expected agreement between the US and the Taliban in the first week of September as Washington's victory in Afghanistan. Since he wants nothing to be left to chance, he is placating Pakistan the way he did never before as there is a belief that Islamabad can play a crucial role in making the Taliban agree to abandon the path of violence and to keep Afghanistan free from foreign extremists.

During Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s recent visit to the US, President Trump openly declared that if Pakistan honestly played the role of a peace facilitator, it could hope to get tremendous benefits from Washington, like revival of financial assistance which was stopped with Pakistan branded as a terrorism-financing nation by the Financial Action Task Force, a global organisation set up for this purpose.

During Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s recent visit to the US, President Trump openly declared that if Pakistan honestly played the role of a peace facilitator, it could hope to get tremendous benefits from Washington like revival of financial assistance which was stopped with Pakistan branded as a terrorism-financing nation by the Financial Action Task Force, a global organisation set up for this purpose.

However, one gets compelled to look at the emerging scenario with skepticism because of the exclusion of India from the peace talks though Pakistan and Iran are participants in the deliberations as guarantors besides the US, Russia, China and the United Nations. India has been given the role of a peace facilitator through its investments in rebuilding Afghanistan, which is not fair. Ideally, India, too, should have been included in the dialogue process as it is one of the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan having considerable stake in peace in that country.

However, India possibly did not fit in with the US scheme of things in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area because the Taliban as well as Islamabad must have opposed New Delhi’s inclusion in the Doha peace talks.

If everything goes on as planned and expected , the talks will first result in the signing of an agreement between the US and the Taliban and then between the Taliban on the one side and Afghanistan’s civil society groups, including those fighting for women's rights, senior government representatives and principal political forces on the other. Despite its assertions, the Ashraf Ghani government is unlikely to be allowed to play a major role in the intra-Afghan negotiations in deference to the wishes of the Taliban.

US peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, leading the American team, has indicated that if the talks do not lead to the signing of a peace agreement, then Afghanistan will go ahead with the scheduled elections in the last week of September despite the Taliban being opposed to the polls. But the US appears to be determined to leave Afghanistan to the Afghans as it no longer wants to risk its resources in terms of money and trained manpower after spending as much as one trillion dollars and losing 2400 troops in the Afghan war.

The US is convinced, though after 18 long years, that the unending war in Afghanistan has only helped the Taliban factions to become stronger than they were in 2001. They continue to kill at will civilians and security personnel through suicide bomb blasts at a time and place of their choosing, to the bewilderment of the Ashraf Ghani government in Kabul.

The government's writ hardly runs beyond Kabul, as reports indicate. Even the Afghanistan capital is not free from the depredations of the Taliban. There is no effect of the peace talks in Doha on their strategy based on violence. Their argument appears to be like this: They are free to do whatever they wish to so long as no agreement has been signed.

Political observers believe the Taliban's unending suicide bombings are part of their pressure tactics to extract the maximum concessions from the US. The question, therefore, arises: Will they really abandon the path of violence when it is there in their DNA?



		EDITOR'S MAIL EDITOR'S COMMENT INDIAN ECONOMY FRANKLY SPEAKING INDIA’S KASHMIR POLICY INDIA’S PAK POLICY REALPOLITIK PM’S I-DAY ADDRESS NATURE’S FURY LYNCHING WEST BENGAL POLITICS CHANDIGARH DIARY HIMACHAL SCENE PUNJAB SCENE HITS & MISSES AFGHAN SCENE AMERICA WATCH TRENDS IN TERRORISM BOOK BAZAAR BOOK BAZAAR SIGNS OF THE TIMES MAN VS WILD PUNJAB’S PRIDE INTERNATIONAL FILM FESTIVAL PIPE TOBACCO ART OF LIVING Issue:June' 2019 Subscribe Now	AFGHAN SCENE Prospects of peace dim Syed Nooruzzaman US and Taliban negotiators wrapping up their eight rounds of peace talks The US-Taliban historic accord, almost certain to be signed in the first week of September, may result in Washington getting disentangled from Afghanistan as desired after withdrawing its remaining troops from there (in fact, it will reduce their number from 14000 to 8000 troops). But no one can say it with certainty that it will bring about the much-needed peace there The US-Taliban historic accord, almost certain to be signed in the first week of September, may result in Washington getting disentangled from Afghanistan as desired after withdrawing its remaining troops from there (in fact, it will reduce their number from 14000 to 8000 troops). But no one can say it with certainty that it will bring about the much-needed peace there. The truth is that at this stage the US is not as much bothered about establishing peace in Afghanistan as it is about withdrawing itself honourably from a difficult war theatre where it had landed itself 18 years ago --- in 2001 --- in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks without keeping in mind an exit route. The latest policy initiative is a clear admission that no power on earth, including the US, the sole surviving super power, can eliminate an enemy with military muscle alone under the circumstances prevailing today. If such a war prolongs, as it happened in the case of Afghanistan, and the forces to be destroyed are guided by an ideology, even if it is an extremist ideology mixed with an element of strong nationalism, there are greater chances of the militaristic approach ending in a fiasco. However, in such a situation, diplomacy can prove to be the most effective weapon. Diplomacy mixed with the use of military might may also produce the desired results if there is honesty and a clear-cut commitment. Barack Obama The Obama administration decided to follow a strategy which involved withdrawal of the US and other NATO forces from Afghanistan, allowing Afghans to run their country the way they wanted to. The US then tried to find a way to induct the Taliban in the power structure in Kabul but without success. The primary reason for the failure was the Taliban insisted on total withdrawal of the foreign forces from their country. The US, so far, has suffered more than it has gained after risking its resources in Afghanistan. When it plunged into a civil war-ravaged nation with the aim of eliminating the Taliban in 2001, the then George Bush administration appeared to be sure that Washington would achieve its objectives with its well-oiled military machine, leaving no trace of the extremist forces in Afghanistan. But the objectives proved to be elusive. The US found to have been caught in a quagmire, a situation in which it could damage only its own interests. The Obama administration, therefore, decided to follow a different strategy which involved withdrawal of the US and other NATO forces from Afghanistan, allowing Afghans to run their country the way they wanted to. The US then tried to find a way to induct the Taliban in the power structure in Kabul but without success. The primary reason for the failure was the Taliban insisted on total withdrawal of the foreign forces from their country which was not acceptable to the US. President Donald Trump, in 2017, decided to handle Afghanistan in a different way, adopting a tactic which was akin to the strategy of President Bush. He announced a big increase in the number of US troops in Afghanistan with a view to not only immobilising the extremist forces there but also to meddle in the affairs of the region on the pretext of protecting Washington's strategic interests. But within a few months he realised that he was indulging in a futile exercise. There were more important objectives to be achieved that to remain entangled in a war theatre which could be managed with low-cost means. Hence his latest efforts to rope in the Taliban in the political dispensation in Kabul after extracting some commitments, including the one that no part of Afghanistan should be allowed to be used by foreign extremist forces like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The Taliban would also have to give a pledge to shun the path of violence. Donald Trump President Donald Trump decided to handle Afghanistan in a different way, adopting a tactic which was akin to the strategy of President Bush. He announced a big increase in the number of US troops in Afghanistan with a view to not only immobilising the extremist forces there but also to meddle in the affairs of the region on the pretext of protecting Washington's strategic interests. But within a few months, he realised that he was indulging in a futile exercise. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan with U.S. President Donald J. Trump This way President Trump wants a major election promise to be fulfilled before he gets fully busy with the 2020 presidential elections. He may interpret the expected agreement between the US and the Taliban in the first week of September as Washington's victory in Afghanistan. Since he wants nothing to be left to chance, he is placating Pakistan the way he did never before as there is a belief that Islamabad can play a crucial role in making the Taliban agree to abandon the path of violence and to keep Afghanistan free from foreign extremists. During Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s recent visit to the US, President Trump openly declared that if Pakistan honestly played the role of a peace facilitator, it could hope to get tremendous benefits from Washington, like revival of financial assistance which was stopped with Pakistan branded as a terrorism-financing nation by the Financial Action Task Force, a global organisation set up for this purpose. During Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s recent visit to the US, President Trump openly declared that if Pakistan honestly played the role of a peace facilitator, it could hope to get tremendous benefits from Washington like revival of financial assistance which was stopped with Pakistan branded as a terrorism-financing nation by the Financial Action Task Force, a global organisation set up for this purpose. However, one gets compelled to look at the emerging scenario with skepticism because of the exclusion of India from the peace talks though Pakistan and Iran are participants in the deliberations as guarantors besides the US, Russia, China and the United Nations. India has been given the role of a peace facilitator through its investments in rebuilding Afghanistan, which is not fair. Ideally, India, too, should have been included in the dialogue process as it is one of the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan having considerable stake in peace in that country. However, India possibly did not fit in with the US scheme of things in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area because the Taliban as well as Islamabad must have opposed New Delhi’s inclusion in the Doha peace talks. If everything goes on as planned and expected , the talks will first result in the signing of an agreement between the US and the Taliban and then between the Taliban on the one side and Afghanistan’s civil society groups, including those fighting for women's rights, senior government representatives and principal political forces on the other. Despite its assertions, the Ashraf Ghani government is unlikely to be allowed to play a major role in the intra-Afghan negotiations in deference to the wishes of the Taliban. US peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, leading the American team, has indicated that if the talks do not lead to the signing of a peace agreement, then Afghanistan will go ahead with the scheduled elections in the last week of September despite the Taliban being opposed to the polls. But the US appears to be determined to leave Afghanistan to the Afghans as it no longer wants to risk its resources in terms of money and trained manpower after spending as much as one trillion dollars and losing 2400 troops in the Afghan war. The US is convinced, though after 18 long years, that the unending war in Afghanistan has only helped the Taliban factions to become stronger than they were in 2001. They continue to kill at will civilians and security personnel through suicide bomb blasts at a time and place of their choosing, to the bewilderment of the Ashraf Ghani government in Kabul. The government's writ hardly runs beyond Kabul, as reports indicate. Even the Afghanistan capital is not free from the depredations of the Taliban. There is no effect of the peace talks in Doha on their strategy based on violence. Their argument appears to be like this: They are free to do whatever they wish to so long as no agreement has been signed. Political observers believe the Taliban's unending suicide bombings are part of their pressure tactics to extract the maximum concessions from the US. The question, therefore, arises: Will they really abandon the path of violence when it is there in their DNA?